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Warrantless Searches for Alcohol by
Native Alaskan Villages: A Permissible
Exercise of Sovereign Rights or an
Assault on Civil Liberties?
PAT HANLEY*
This Article analyzes the legality of border searches employed by
Native Alaskan villages (“NAVs”) to prevent the importation of
alcohol into their communities. The Article first discusses the application of the search and seizure requirements of the Fourth
Amendment and Indian Civil Rights Act to NAVs, finding that the
recent federal recognition of NAVs as tribes frees them from complying with the Fourth Amendment and that the requirements of
the Indian Civil Rights Act are largely unenforceable due to judicial interpretation of the Act. The Article then addresses the extent
of sovereign power possessed by NAVs and determines that their
domestic dependent nation status reduces the scope of sovereign
powers and likely would mandate against border searches. The
Article advises that NAVs should not be permitted to conduct
border searches due to the intrusion on personal liberty and restriction of free travel within the United States, yet concludes that it
will be difficult to halt these searches as judicial review is highly
unlikely.

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980, the Alaska Legislature passed a statute permitting established villages and municipalities to prohibit the sale, importation, and/or possession of alcohol upon an affirmative majority
1
vote of the electorate. Presently, out of approximately 235 comCopyright © 1997 by Alaska Law Review
* Attorney from Anchorage, Alaska and former school teacher in the villages of Red Devil, Kwigillingok, and Quinhagak. J.D., University of Utah College of Law, 1996; B.A.E., Pacific Lutheran University, 1988. The author wishes
to thank Judy Bush, formerly of Alaska Legal Services and currently Reservation
Attorney for the Lummi Nation in Bellingham, Washington, for her review and
suggestions, and Professor Alexander T. Skibine of the University of Utah College of law, for his tutelage and enthusiasm for Indian Law.
1. See ALASKA STAT. § 04.11.490 (Michie 1980), repealed by 1995 Alaska
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munities in Alaska, seventy-eight have banned the sale and importation of alcohol, while twenty-eight have banned the possession of
alcohol completely.2 Some Native Alaskan villages (“NAVs”), apparently frustrated with the statute’s lack of effectiveness in deterring alcohol importation and use, have adopted more assertive
means of enforcement. Most NAVs are remote and not accessible
by road; therefore, travel to NAVs is predominantly by small air3
plane. Several NAVs in southwestern Alaska have set up stations
at the village airplane runway in order to search people and their
4
luggage for alcohol before they are permitted to enter the village.
These searches are systematic and are conducted without warrants
or any showing of probable cause.
The legal analysis of these searches begins with the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no [w]arrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or
5
things to be seized.

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as requiring the use of search warrants based on probable cause in most
6
searches. However, several exceptions have been allowed, inSess. Laws § 69 ch. 101. The repealing law enacted ALASKA STAT. § 04.11.491
(Michie 1995) (permitting communities to ban the sale, importation, and/or possession of alcohol).
2. See ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD, SCHEDULE OF LOCAL
OPTION COMMUNITIES (1997). Twenty-three villages have voted to ban both sale
and importation, and possession of alcohol, resulting in 83 villages who have
banned the sale and importation of alcohol and/or possession of alcohol.
3. Many NAVs can be reached by boat during the summer and by snowmobile during the winter. Air travel, however, is the only practical and regularly
scheduled form of long distance travel to and from most NAVs.
4. NAVs known to have conducted such alcohol searches include Chefornak, Kipnuk, and Kwigillingok. Due to the informal nature of the political system
in some NAVs, and the lack of any official reporting of unique law enforcement
efforts, it is difficult to know if other NAVs have also conducted searches for alcohol. See Tom Kizzia, Get Out of Town, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 2, 1997,
at A1 (part of special news section Indian Country: Two Destinies, One Land,
June 29-July 5, 1997).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978) (“Aware of
the long struggle between Crown and press and desiring to curb unjustified official intrusions, the Framers took the enormously important step of subjecting
searches to the test of reasonableness and to the general rule requiring search
warrants issued by neutral magistrates.”); see also State v. Lucero, 692 P.2d 287
(Ariz. 1984); People v. Nash, 341 N.W.2d 439 (Mich. 1983); State v. Mazur, 280
N.W.2d 194 (Wis. 1979); State v. Tant, 287 So. 2d 458 (La. 1973).
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cluding the United States’s right to search the baggage or automobile of every person crossing its border without probable cause or
even mere suspicion.7 This border search exception to the Fourth
Amendment is grounded in the recognized right of the United
States to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the
8
Constitution, who and what may enter the country. When the Supreme Court was confronted with the constitutionality of border
searches in United States v. Ramsey, the Court clearly stated that
[b]order searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, have been considered to be “reasonable” by the
single fact that the person or item in question had entered into
our country from outside. There has never been any additional
requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable cause. This longstanding
recognition that searches at our borders without probable cause
and without a warrant are nonetheless “reasonable” has a history as old as the Fourth Amendment itself. We reaffirm it
9
now.

On its face, the Fourth Amendment appears to prohibit NAVs
from searching incoming travelers for alcohol without the showing
10
of probable cause necessary for the issuance of a warrant. First,
however, it must be determined whether the United States Constitution applies to the actions of NAVs. As explained below, the
Constitution does not apply to the actions of recognized American
Indian tribes because those tribes enjoy certain sovereign powers.
However, language almost identical to the Fourth Amendment
was incorporated into the Indian Civil Rights Act, which does apply to American Indian tribes.
Next, it must be determined whether the sovereign powers
possessed by American Indian tribes grant them the right to conduct border searches. As discussed in this Article, the reasonable7. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (upholding warrantless searches of envelopes containing heroin when sent through international
mail into the United States). But see Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805,
808 (9th Cir. 1967) (qualifying the general rule that not even “mere suspicion” is
required to justify searching the baggage of a person who crosses the United
States border by concluding that “at least a real suspicion” is required before a
person may be strip-searched).
8. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616-17.
9. Id. at 619.
10. Under particular circumstances, searches do not violate the Fourth
Amendment if the government has probable cause to believe a suspect possesses
contraband and a warrant is impracticable to obtain. See, e.g., Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (upholding a warrantless search of an automobile
containing suspected bootleggers, because in the time it would have taken to secure a warrant, the suspected bootleggers could have escaped with the car and its
illegal cargo).
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ness of Ramsey border searches does not necessarily apply to Indian border searches as there are significant differences between
international borders and village borders, and Indian border
searches restrict lawful travel within the United States.
Part II of this Article addresses whether NAVs are “Indian
tribes” such that they possess certain sovereign powers and, thus,
are free from the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. This
discussion is brief, as recent Clinton Administration recognition of
NAVs as Indian tribes resolves this question in the affirmative.
Part III discusses the application of the Indian Civil Rights Act to
NAV actions and whether it restricts Indian border searches. Part
IV explores the extent of NAVs’ sovereign powers and applies the
domestic dependent nation status to test the validity of tribal border searches. Part V addresses whether several of the exceptions
to Fourth Amendment rights, including the general urgency of law
enforcement and consent to searches, can be utilized to justify
NAV actions. Finally, Part VI briefly discusses the likelihood of
judicial review of the NAV border searches.
II. APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO TRIBAL
BORDER SEARCHES
The most convincing arguments NAVs can assert to justify or
defend warrantless searches for alcohol depend upon a finding that
NAVs enjoy the status of “Indian tribes” and, as a result, are endowed with tribal sovereignty. If they do enjoy sovereignty, their
actions will not be restricted by the Fourth Amendment because
the United States Supreme Court has held that certain provisions
of the United States Constitution do not apply to Indian tribes.
11
For example, the Court held in Talton v. Mayes that the Cherokee
nation was not bound by the grand jury requirements imposed
upon the federal government by the Fifth Amendment: “as the
powers of local self government enjoyed by the Cherokee nation
existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by
12
the Fifth Amendment.” The Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Mar11. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
12. Id. at 384; see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978)
(holding the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment was not violated
when successive federal and tribal prosecutions were brought); Native Am.
Church of North Am. v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 135 (10th Cir. 1959)
(holding that the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause does not apply to a tribe
through any provision of the Constitution). The Court in Wheeler reasoned that
the Navajo tribe was exercising governmental powers that are not delegated to
the tribe by federal authority. 435 U.S. at 328. Citing Talton, the Wheeler Court
iterated that the power to punish tribal offenders was not affected by the Fifth
Amendment, even though the Amendment applied to the federal government
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13
tinez explained the opinion in Talton by stating that

[a]s separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes
have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal
or state authority. Thus in Talton v. Mayes . . . , this Court held
that the Fifth Amendment did not “operat[e] upon” “the powers
of local self-government enjoyed” by the tribes. . . . In ensuing
years, the lower federal courts have extended the holding of
Talton to other provisions of the Bill of Rights, as well as to the
14
Fourteenth Amendment.

Judicial recognition of a tribe was outlined by the Supreme
15
Court in Montoya v. United States, where the Court defined a
tribe as “a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a
community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a
16
particular though sometimes ill-defined territory.” Legislative or
administrative recognition of a tribe by the federal government is
17
also possible. The Court has ruled that it must follow the execu18
The Court
tive branch’s determination in recognizing tribes.
stated that
[i]n reference to all matters of this kind, it is the rule of this court
to follow the action of the executive and other political departments of the government, whose more special duty it is to determine such affairs. If by them those Indians are recognized as
19
a tribe, this court must do the same.

Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court has stated that “judicial
recognition of tribal sovereign immunity” depends on “whether
Congress, or the executive branch of the federal government . . .
20
recognize[s] the particular group in question as a tribe” and that
this recognition is “a nonjusticiable political question, [and] the
21
[c]ommunity is entitled to all of the benefits of tribal status.”
However, federal and state courts have differed in their view
of whether various congressional and executive branch actions
directly and to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. For further discussion of Indian tribes’ freedom from constitutional constraints, see
ROBERT N. CLINTON, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 318 (3d ed. 1991).
13. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
14. Id. at 56 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
15. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
16. Id. at 266.
17. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46-47 (1913) (suggesting that
the courts should defer to executive and legislative recognition of Indian tribes).
18. See United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865).
19. Id. at 419.
20. Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757 P.2d 32,
34-35 (Alaska 1988) (citing Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 161-63 (Alaska
1977)).
21. Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 162-63.
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were intended to recognize NAVs as tribes.22 The most contentious interpretation of congressional intent surrounded the 1971
passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
23
(“ANCSA”). The Ninth Circuit held that ANCSA “was congres24
sional recognition of the Native [v]illages.” The Alaska Supreme
Court in Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Plan25
ning disagreed: “[t]o the contrary, passage of [ANCSA] evidences
Congress’s intent that non-reservation villages be largely subject to
26
state law.”
Recent executive branch recognition of NAVs as tribes almost
certainly will reconcile the inconsistent rulings of the Ninth Circuit
and the Alaska Supreme Court such that NAVs will be recognized
judicially as tribes and therefore will enjoy certain sovereign pow27
ers. On January 11, 1993, five months after the Alaska Supreme
Court restated its conclusion that the federal executive branch had
28
not recognized NAVs as tribes, the Clinton Administration, via
the Department of the Interior, stated that NAVs listed in
29
ANCSA are considered Indian tribes for purposes of federal law.
In response, the Bureau of Indian Affairs published a list of 225
NAVs on October 21, 1993 to express clearly those villages that
22. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary of Interior’s recognition of a NAV’s Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”) council constituted tribal
recognition. See Native Village of Noatak v. Hoffman, 896 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th
Cir. 1990). The Alaska Supreme Court disagreed, stating that “the mere approval
of a[n IRA] constitution . . . does not suffice to afford . . . tribal status for the purpose of application of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.” Stevens, 757
P.2d at 40 (finding that the fact that the Secretary of the Interior approved the
constitution of a NAV was insufficient to show that they had tribal sovereignty
because the village had never been granted a reservation).
23. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629(f) (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
24. Noatak, 896 F.2d at 1160.
25. 757 P.2d 32 (Alaska 1988).
26. Id. at 41. Furthermore, Justice Moore in his concurring opinion in Nenana
Fuel v. Native Village of Venetie, 834 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1992), stated that “[a]ny
finding that ANCSA did not abolish native sovereignty clearly would be at odds
with Congress’[s] desire to abolish the reservation system and to avoid prolonged
wardship or trusteeship of Alaska Natives.” Id. at 1239 (Moore, J., concurring).
27. Tribal status confirms that certain sovereign powers and defenses will be
available to NAVs. However, NAVs may not be endowed with the same powers
as Indian tribes in the contiguous United States unless the land owned by NAV
corporations constitutes “Indian country.” This issue will be decided by the
United States Supreme Court as it reviews the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Alaska ex
rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t (Venetie II),
101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997). See infra notes
70-75 and accompanying text.
28. See Nenana, 834 P.2d at 1237.
29. See Op. Sol. Gen. of Dep’t of the Interior, M-36,975, 58-59 (Jan. 11, 1993).
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enjoy tribal status,30 stating that
[t]he purpose of the current publication is to publish an Alaska
list of entities conforming to the intent of 25 CFR 83.6(b) and to
eliminate any doubt as to the Department’s intention by expressly and unequivocally acknowledging that the Department
has determined that the villages and regional tribes listed below
are distinctly Native communities and have the same status as
31
tribes in the contiguous [forty-eight] states.

Due to the expressed intention of the United States Supreme
Court and Alaska Supreme Court to honor executive branch tribal
recognition, it appears that NAVs now indeed are “Indian tribes”
for purposes of federal law. This classification is significant in the
context of NAV warrantless searches for alcohol because, as Indian tribes, NAVs will not be directly restricted by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Sovereign status
arguably could justify warrantless customs searches at NAV borders.
III. APPLICATION OF THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT TO TRIBAL
BORDER SEARCHES
Tribes are subject to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968
32
(“ICRA”). ICRA places on Indian tribes many of the civil liberties restrictions found in the Bill of Rights, including the restraint
33
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The issue of whether
NAV border searches will be considered per se reasonable under
ICRA by analogy to the United States’s border search powers or,
alternatively, whether ICRA will preclude NAV border searches is
explored below.
Congress can impose restrictions on Indian tribes based on its
34
plenary authority over tribal relations. Because the important
civil liberties protections set forth in the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment were unenforceable against Indian tribes,
35
Congress exercised its plenary power and passed ICRA. Section
30. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364, 54,368-69 (1993).
31. Id. at 54,365.
32. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994).
33. See id. § 1302(2).
34. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1903) (“Plenary
authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress
from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not
subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”); see also
DAVID S. CASE, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 4 (1984) (“Congress has
full or ‘complete’ power in the field of Indian affairs.”).
35. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341. Although ICRA imposes many of the Bill of
Rights’s civil liberties guarantees upon the actions of Indian tribes, there are sev-
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1302(2) of ICRA is of particular importance, stating that “no Indian [t]ribe in exercising powers of self government shall . . . violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor
issue warrants, but upon probable cause . . . .”36 While the Fourth
Amendment does not apply directly to Indian tribes, Congress essentially has imposed Fourth Amendment restrictions upon the
tribes through ICRA. Therefore, ICRA restricts, at least textually,
Indian tribes from performing unreasonable searches and seizures.
Ten years after Congress passed ICRA, however, the Supreme Court crippled the Act’s effectiveness by severely limiting
37
its federal enforcement. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the
Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction only to provide relief for alleged ICRA violations if a tribe has physically detained a
38
person. Examining the legislative history of the Act, the Court
found that Congress had been committed to the goal of tribal selfdetermination, and that Congress had intended that a writ of habeas corpus would provide the appropriate and exclusive federal
39
remedy under ICRA. This conclusion is puzzling because the
legislative history demonstrates a concern for the preservation of
Indians’ personal liberties against abuses by governments, includ40
ing Indian tribal governments. To buttress its logic, the Court
eral notable exceptions. For example, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) does not prevent Indian tribes from establishing a religion, and 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) does not require
free counsel in criminal cases.
36. Id. § 1302(2).
37. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
38. See id. at 66-70.
39. See id. at 66-67. Section 1303 of ICRA states that “[t]he privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of the United
States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C.
§ 1303.
40. The Senate Report, which accompanied ICRA and clearly expressed frustration with the federal courts’ refusal to extend the protections of the Bill of
Rights to Indian tribal governments, resulting in tribal members being denied basic constitutional rights: “[u]nder this rationale . . . tribes have been permitted to
impose a tax without complying with the due process requirements, tribal membership rights can be revoked at the will of tribal governing officials, and Indians
have been deprived of the right to be represented by counsel.” S. REP. NO. 90721, at 24 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837, 1864. The report continued:
The proposed Indian legislation . . . is an effort on the part of those who
believe in constitutional rights for all Americans to give ‘the forgotten
Americans’ basic rights which all other Americans enjoy. These measures will not cure all the ills suffered by the American Indians, but they
will be important steps in alleviating many inequities and injustices with
which they are faced.
Id. at 26-27, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1867.
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noted the express congressional concern that remedies other than
habeas corpus would likely lead to “‘undue or precipitous interference in the affairs of the Indian people.’”41 As a result, the ostensible congressional intent of ICRA is frustrated because many potential violations of the Act will lack a federal forum unless a tribe
detains the individual whose rights under ICRA are violated.
Thus, the effect of Santa Clara Pueblo is that existing tribal courts
retain much of the responsibility to provide remedies under
42
The Court further stated that Congress retains the
ICRA.
authority to provide other remedies if it finds tribes are deficient in
43
applying and enforcing ICRA.
Thus, tribal status frees NAVs from the restrictions of the
Fourth Amendment. While ICRA technically prohibits their
searches for alcohol without probable cause, alleged violations
thereof are not judicially reviewable unless a NAV has detained an
individual. Of course, a person could effectively force the issue by
refusing to be searched and still enter the village, despite orders to
leave. Village authorities then could either capitulate, thereby
41. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 67 (quoting SUBCOMM. ON CONSTIRIGHTS, SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 89TH CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN: SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT TO S. RES. 194, 11 (Comm. Print 1966)).
42. An exception to the Santa Clara Pueblo rule has emerged in the Tenth
Circuit, in Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682
(10th Cir. 1980). There the court permitted federal judicial relief against a tribe
when a non-Native lacked a tribal forum in which to litigate his claim. See id. at
684-85. Some Indian tribes have voluntarily adopted major portions of ICRA
into their tribal Constitution, including the prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures. See 1 N.T.C. § 4 (1977) (Navajo Tribal Code) (adopting the text of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution); 22 C.N.C.A. § 1223
(1992) (Cherokee Nation Code Annotated) (“A search warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing
the person, and particularly describing the property and the place to be
searched.”); CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA art. I (“The
Cherokee Nation is an inseparable part of the Federal Union. The Constitution
of the United States is the Supreme law of the land; therefore, the Cherokee Nation shall never enact any law which is in conflict with any Federal law.”).
43. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72. While it appears that ICRA is an
anemic protector of civil rights, it is possible that its effectiveness could be bolstered through the power of federal funding. Parties who believe that a tribe is
blatantly disregarding ICRA could lobby the various congressional committees
handling Indian-related issues, such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to pressure
the tribe into compliance. In turn, Congress could condition spending on Indianrelated projects to effect stronger adherence to ICRA. Finally, if NAV practices
were viewed as radical and overly variant from mainstream civil rights protections, Congress could assert its plenary powers and prohibit NAV warrantless
searches outright.
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avoiding an ICRA violation, or enforce their order by detaining
the individual. Enforcing their order would give rise to a claim for
an ICRA violation which would be reviewable in federal court.
Currently, then, unless travelers confront village authorities by refusing to be searched, ICRA does not effectively prevent NAVs
44
from conducting warrantless alcohol searches at their borders.
IV. APPLICATION OF DOMESTIC DEPENDENT NATION STATUS TO
TRIBAL BORDER SEARCHES
The United States Supreme Court consistently has ruled that
Indian tribes possess sovereignty and the powers that accompany
45
it, including the power to
(1) adopt and operate a form of government of the tribe’s
choosing, (2) define conditions of tribal membership, (3) regulate domestic relations of members, (4) prescribe rules of inheritance, (5) levy taxes, (6) regulate property within tribal jurisdic46
tion and (7) control the conduct of tribal members.

Tribes also enjoy sovereign immunity and thus cannot be sued
47
without their consent. Since tribal sovereign powers are inherent,
no authority from the federal government is required for the tribe
48
to assert them.
However, tribal sovereign powers are limited. First, Congress’s power over Indian affairs is plenary, granting it legal free49
dom to limit tribal sovereignty. Second, tribal sovereignty is lim-

44. Also note that civil suits against NAVs for violating civil liberties would
be unsuccessful because NAVs as tribes are endowed with tribal sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Native Village of Tyonek v. Puckett, 957 F.2d 631, 636 (9th Cir.
1992) (remanding for a factual finding as to whether a NAV was an Indian tribe
protected by sovereign immunity and whether its property was “Indian country,”
which would immunize it against a suit challenging a NAV leasing ordinance on
the basis of racial discrimination); Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757 P.2d 32, 34 (Alaska 1988) (holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar a breach of contract action against a NAV because
the NAV was not sufficiently self-governing to meet the court’s standard for sovereignty). Sovereign immunity will, of course, depend upon a finding that NAVs
are tribes. After the recent express recognition of NAVS as tribes by the Department of the Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs, the NAVs are almost certain to enjoy similar sovereign immunity.
45. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
46. CASE, supra note 34, at 439 (citation omitted).
47. See id.
48. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 130 (holding that the Apache Tribe had the inherent power to impose a tax as part of its power to pay for the costs of selfgovernment).
49. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (“Indian tribes are subject
to the dominant authority of Congress.”); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
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ited by tribes’ “domestic dependent” status.50 More than 150 years
ago, Chief Justice John Marshall laid down principles that still
form an important part of the relationship between Indian tribes
51
and the federal government. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
Marshall established the principle that Indian tribes are under the
dominion of the United States:
They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well
as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty
and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire
their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of
52
hostility.

However, in Worcester v. Georgia53 Marshall also recognized a
certain degree of tribal sovereignty:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, . . . and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a
weaker power does not surrender its independence — its right to
self government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its
protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may
place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without
stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a
54
state.

These two principles appear incompatible. Chief Justice Marshall summarized the status of Indian tribes as “domestic depend55
ent nations,” meaning they retain sovereignty with regard to internal matters of the tribe. This allows Indians to make their own
56
laws and be governed by them. Justice Marshall then expressly
identified two powers that Indian tribes did not possess based on
U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“[T]he common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed
by sovereign powers is an aspect of tribal sovereignty . . . subject to the superior
and plenary control of Congress.”). Examples of Congress exercising its superior
and plenary power and interfering with tribal self-government include the Indian
Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885)
(divesting tribes of the power to punish its own members for major crimes); Act
of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 4, 67 Stat. 588, 589 (extending state civil
and criminal jurisdiction over tribes in certain states, including Alaska); and the
Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994) (imposing most of the Bill
of Rights’s liberty protections upon tribes).
50. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 17-18.
53. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding that Georgia laws had no effect on
Cherokee Reservation).
54. Id. at 559-61.
55. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
56. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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their status. As noted above, tribal governments cannot conduct
foreign affairs,57 nor can they alienate tribal lands without federal
58
consent.
For approximately 150 years following the Cherokee cases, no
additional limitations on tribal sovereignty were found as a result
of the domestic dependent status of tribes. Then in 1978, the Supreme Court established a standard to assist in determining
whether tribes can exercise certain powers. In United States v.
59
Wheeler, the Court reasoned that
our cases recognize that the Indian tribes have not given up their
full sovereignty . . . . The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But
until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign
powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a
60
necessary result of their dependent status . . . .

The Court then began expanding Chief Justice Marshall’s list
of powers that tribes do not possess due to their domestic dependent status. Powers denied to tribes now include (1) the exercise of
61
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, (2) the power to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian-owned land
within a reservation (at least where it cannot be shown that tribal
62
interests are affected), and (3) the power to regulate liquor sales
63
on reservations. However, powers held to be consistent with a
tribe’s domestic dependent status include (1) the power to punish
64
their own members and (2) the power to tax non-Indians for their
65
activities on reservations.
Presumably, NAVs would be endowed with these same powers due to their recent recognition as tribes by the executive
branch of the federal government. However, because NAVs have
a history different from Indian tribes of the contiguous forty-eight
states and have been treated differently by Congress, NAVs do not

57. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18.
58. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
59. 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding Indian tribes retain the power to punish their
own members).
60. Id. at 323 (emphasis added) (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
61. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
62. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981).
63. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983).
64. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326-28 (1978).
65. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1980); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130, 149 (1982).
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necessarily have the same sovereign powers as Indian tribes. The
most notable difference between NAVs and Indian tribes is the
passage of ANCSA,66 through which the Alaska Natives received
forty-four million acres of land and $962.5 million in exchange for
67
the termination of aboriginal land claims in Alaska. This land
conveyance in fee to the Alaska Natives stands in contrast to the
68
earlier establishment of reservations for most Indian tribes.
While NAV land has not been considered as “Indian country” until recently, when the Ninth Circuit ruled that ANCSA did not ex69
tinguish Indian country in Alaska, reservation lands historically
have been considered “Indian country.” The following sections
will determine if NAVs enjoy the same sovereign powers as other
Indian tribes residing on Indian country, will address the power to
exclude people from NAVs, and will discuss the domestic dependent status limitations of NAVs in the context of warrantless
searches for alcohol.
A. Indian Country — Does it Make a Difference for NAVs?
Most tribal sovereign powers flow directly from tribal status.
Some powers, however, are dependent upon a finding that the
tribes are located in Indian country. An excellent illustration is the
case of Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School District v. Native Village
70
of Venetie Tribal Government, where the United States District
Court for the District of Alaska recently considered whether the
land owned by a NAV in fee constituted Indian country such that
71
it could impose taxes on non-members. The court concluded that
the NAV constituted a tribe, but that the lands of the NAV were
not Indian country, “and, therefore, the Tribal Government did
not have the power to impose a tax upon non-members of the tribe
72
such as the plaintiffs.” Thus, according to the district court, at
least the power to tax non-members requires not only a showing of
73
tribal status, but also a finding of Indian country.

66. Act of Dec. 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 689 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1994)).
67. See 43 U.S.C. § 1603.
68. See id. § 1613.
69. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov’t, 101 F.3d 1286, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478
(1997).
70. No. F87-0051 CV, 1995 WL 462232, at *1 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 1995), rev’d,
101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
71. See id.
72. Id. at *20.
73. Certain other powers granted to Indian tribes depend on a finding that
the tribes reside on “Indian lands.” For example, the Indian Gaming Regulatory
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The Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that ANCSA did not extinguish Indian country in Alaska,74 and the Supreme Court granted
75
certiorari to review the issue. If the Court concludes that NAVs
do not occupy Indian country, they will not possess the same range
of sovereign powers as do Indian tribes in the lower forty-eight
states. The difficulty in determining which powers are dependent
upon a finding of Indian country is that most Indian cases involve
tribes that reside on reservations, which constitute Indian country,
and therefore the issue is rarely addressed. Thus, it is difficult to
predict whether NAVs will be determined to inhabit “Indian country,” which in turn will affect their powers to conduct warrantless
border searches.
B. The Power to Exclude People from NAVs
76
The Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia stated that persons were allowed to enter Cherokee land only “with the assent of
77
the Cherokees themselves.” The Ninth Circuit has relied on this
principle, stating that “intrinsic in the sovereignty of an Indian
78
tribe is the power to exclude trespassers from the reservation,”
and that “the tribe has the inherent power to exclude non79
members from the reservation.” Indian law scholar Felix S. Cohen has concluded that a tribe needs no grant of authority from the
federal government to exercise, either as a government or as a
80
landowner, the inherent power of exclusion from tribal territory.
It is not clear from the Ninth Circuit rulings whether the power to
exclude is restricted to tribes living on reservations, as the deciAct, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994), allows Indian tribes to operate gaming in certain states. Gaming is only allowed, however, on “Indian lands,” defined by the
Act to include (1) lands within an Indian reservation, (2) lands held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of Indian tribes, or (3) lands held by tribes subject to
restriction by the United States against alienation. See id. § 2703. The ANCSA
lands owned by NAVs do not satisfy this definition. Therefore, unlike most Indian tribes, which usually occupy lands within a reservation, NAVs are not permitted to operate gaming on their lands.
74. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov’t (Venetie II), 101 F.3d 1286, 1302 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.
Ct. 2478 (1997).
75. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Gov’t, 117 S. Ct. 2478 (1997).
76. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
77. Id. at 561.
78. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975).
79. Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1976)
(citations omitted).
80. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 291-94, 306
(Rennard Strickland & Charles F. Wilkinson eds., Michie 1982).
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sions state, or if tribes as landowners can exclude people from
“tribal territory,” as Cohen stated.81 While this distinction may appear trivial, it is significant because NAVs are not situated on reservations. NAVs do, however, own the land on which they reside,
82
which could fairly be characterized as “tribal territory.”
Moreover, ANCSA should not be read to strip NAVs of their
exclusionary powers. ANCSA does not clearly express intent to
open NAV lands to the general public, and the Supreme Court has
adhered to “the general rule that statutes passed for the benefit of
dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indi83
ans.” Thus, NAVs may maintain whatever tribal exclusionary
powers they had before ANCSA.
NAVs may also be able to rely on their status as private entities. Private individuals can generally prevent people from enter84
ing their homes, or condition entry upon certain circumstances,
such as a border search. However, private land can become public
in nature such that the private land owner can no longer indiscriminately prohibit entry upon it or abridge people’s constitu85
tional rights once they are upon the land. In Marsh v. Alabama,
Grace Marsh was arrested and convicted of distributing religious
literature in the town of Chickasaw, Alabama, contrary to the rules
86
of the town’s management. Marsh contended, inter alia, that the
town’s rules violated the First Amendment of the United States
87
Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed Marsh’s conviction,
holding that private ownership of the town did not exempt it from
the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment:
We do not agree that the corporation’s property interests settle
the question. The State urges in effect that the corporation’s
right to control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with
the right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests.
We can not accept that contention. Ownership does not always
mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for the use by the public in general, the
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
84. See Barrett v. Kunzig, 331 F. Supp. 266, 272 (1971) (“[T]he United States
Government . . . could make use of its property as could any private citizen with
his home. Hence, it could prevent entry or make such conditions as it deemed
proper as a precedent to entry.”).
85. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
86. See id. at 502. Chickasaw was a company town owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation.
87. See id.
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88

constitutional rights of those who use it.

Thus, when a privately owned town assumes the functions of a
government, it becomes subject to constitutional limitations in its
relations with the public.
NAVs, bearing many of the public attributes listed in Marsh,
may be subject to such limitations. While most NAVs are not accessible by road, travelers arriving by plane generally are free to
access public facilities such as the state-maintained airport runway
and roads, post office, state-owned schools, and stores owned by
village corporations. While NAVs can assert that they do not open
their villages to the public as did the town of Chickasaw, many
NAVs have acknowledged their public status by incorporating
89
themselves as cities. Furthermore, federal regulations require
that roads constructed with federal funds on Indian reservations be
90
kept open to the public. If NAVs use federal funds to build
roads, boardwalks, or other components of transportation, they
would presumably be required to keep them open to the public, including non-Natives. Arguably, NAVs could not condition entry
by the public on submission to searches that would violate both the
Fourth Amendment and ICRA. While the State of Alaska does
not have the same plenary powers over Indians as does Congress,
the state arguably could condition the use of public money to fund
state projects upon NAVs allowing public access to those projects.
Thus if the state funds roads, boardwalks, schools, airport runways,
runway maintenance, or other projects in NAVs, the public may
have the right to access them, notwithstanding fee ownership of
91
lands by NAVs.
However, a ruling by the Supreme Court that NAVs occupy
Indian country would bolster NAVs’ contention that they retain
the power to exclude. As United States Attorney for Alaska Bob
Bundy recently stated, “[i]n Indian country, [NAVs] have authority to throw anybody out. If there’s no Indian country, people are
92
free to exercise the right to travel.”
In short, the issue of exclusionary powers is not clear as applied to NAVs. It is noteworthy, however, that many NAVs are

88. Id. at 505-06 (footnote omitted).
89. One NAV is incorporated as a home rule city, ten as first class cities, and
98 as second class cities. See THE ALASKA MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, ALASKA DEPT.
OF COMMUNITY & REGIONAL AFFAIRS, 1997 ALASKA MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS
DIRECTORY (1997). Chefornak, one of the villages known to conduct warrantless
searches for alcohol, is incorporated as a second class city. See id. at 1.
90. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 170.8 (1980) (requiring that roads constructed by Bureau of Indian Affairs remain open to the public).
91. See CASE, supra note 34, for a brief discussion of state funding in NAVs.
92. Kizzia, supra note 4, at A1.
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incorporated as cities, and are endowed with many of the public
attributes of the privately owned town in Marsh. Therefore, while
NAVs still maintain many rights of private ownership, they may
not have the general right to deny to the public the use of federally
or state funded public facilities.93
C. The Domestic Dependent Status Limitation of NAVs
NAVs almost certainly possess some sovereign powers in the
wake of their recognition as tribes by the federal executive branch.
Given such powers, NAVs may contend they have the concomitant
power to protect their territorial integrity with whatever force is
necessary, including searching visitors, and that this power has
never been divested by Congress. As discussed above, however,
tribal sovereign powers are limited by the status of Indian tribes as
domestic dependent nations. Therefore, the NAV assertion of
border search powers must withstand the test established in United
94
States v. Wheeler.
In Wheeler, the Supreme Court held in part that “Indian tribes
still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty
or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their depend95
ent status.” Since Alaska Natives did not sign a treaty with the
96
United States, treaties did not divest them of sovereignty. As for
statutes, ICRA arguably divests from Alaska Natives the power to
97
search people without probable cause ; however, as discussed
93. In Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1973), the court concluded, based on legislative history, that ANCSA was not intended to extinguish
civil tort claims like trespass by third parties on land under Indian title. See id. at
1371. The alleged trespassers in this case, however, were the State of Alaska, oil
companies, and other commercial entities who had used Arctic Slope lands prior
to ANCSA, not private individuals with personal liberties guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. See id. at 1364-65.
94. 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (holding that Indian tribes retain the power to
punish their own members).
95. Id. at 323 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978)).
96. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 911 (1993)
(“Alaska Natives, because of Alaska’s history, harsh climate, and remote location,
did not enter into the special treaty relationships with the United States that had
secured unique legal and political status for tribes in the ‘lower 48.’”); Atkinson v.
Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 154 (Alaska 1977) (“[T]he government never intended to
enter into treaties with Alaskan Natives.”).
97. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of selfgovernment shall . . . violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”); see
also GETCHES ET AL., supra note 96, at 499 (“The resulting legislation [(ICRA)]
imposed on tribes regiments tracking many of the constitutional restraints on
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above, ICRA is essentially unenforceable against tribes. Therefore, the inquiry must focus on whether NAV border search powers are withdrawn “by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”98 In that light, the discussion below will explore
recent Supreme Court cases addressing intrusions on personal liberties by a tribe in a criminal context and the restriction of free
travel within the United States.
1. Intrusions on personal liberties by Indian tribes. NAV
warrantless searches for alcohol may well be ruled inconsistent
with their domestic dependent status, and prohibited because the
searches interfere with the interest of the United States in
protecting its citizens from intrusions on their personal liberty
without justification. In the 1978 case of Oliphant v. Suquamish
99
Indian Tribe, tribal authorities arrested Oliphant, a non-Indian,
and charged him with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting
100
arrest. He was arraigned before a tribal court and released on his
own recognizance, but the tribal court proceedings against him
were stayed when Oliphant challenged the tribal court’s
101
jurisdiction over him. Ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by Indians over non-Indians
was inconsistent with the domestic dependent status of Indian
102
The reasoning the Court employed in making this
tribes.
determination is of particular importance to the validity of NAV
alcohol searches. The Court found that the tribe’s power to punish
non-Indian offenders was inconsistent with its dependent status
because the surrender of a tribe’s full sovereignty entailed the
103
surrender of certain rights. Moreover, the Court stated that “the
United States has manifested . . . [a] great solicitude that its
citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted
104
While incarceration or
intrusions on their personal liberty.”
other forms of punishment may be greater intrusions on one’s
personal liberty than personal searches for alcohol, the Court’s
statement reveals its willingness to strike down tribal actions that
infringe upon individual liberties. Also, because both the Fourth
105
Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act provide for
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has a
states and the federal government.”).
98. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
99. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
100. See id. at 194.
101. See id. at 194-95.
102. See id. at 208-10.
103. See id. at 210.
104. Id.
105. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2) (1994).
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strong basis for striking down tribal action that violates this right.
In 1981, the Supreme Court articulated a narrow view of the
sovereignty retained by tribes. In Montana v. United States, 106 the
Court held that Indian tribes lacked the inherent power to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian owned land
within a reservation – at least where the tribe could not show that
107
tribal interests were affected. The Court stated that “exercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without ex108
press congressional delegation.” Therefore, unless NAVs can establish that warrantless searches for alcohol are necessary to protect tribal self-government or internal relations, their efforts will
109
be struck down.
NAVs can argue that border searches are necessary to prevent
the deleterious effects of alcohol among Native Americans from
110
seriously damaging their internal relations. However, this justifi-

106. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
107. See id. at 564-66.
108. Id. at 564 (emphasis added).
109. Not all (if, in fact, any) Indian tribes conduct warrantless searches for alcohol, as do some NAVs. Therefore, it appears that in general such searches are
not necessary for tribal self-government (assuming these tribes are successfully
exercising tribal self-government).
110. “The alcoholism mortality rate among American Indians [including Native Alaskans] is 612 % higher than that of all other races in the United States.”
Paul Levy, Caught Between Cultures Despite Barriers, A Few Indians Become
Physicians—But Many More Are Needed, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), July 7,
1991, Sunday Magazine, at 06SM. In addition, Alaska has one of the highest rates
of fetal alcohol syndrome in the country. See Sandi McDaniel, How Alaska Battles FAS Disease With No Cure is 100% Preventable, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
June 16, 1995, at A5. The recent ban of alcohol from Barrow, Alaska illustrates
the tremendous effect alcohol can have on a community and arguably the internal
relations of many NAVs. The voters in Barrow banned alcohol from the town for
one year, until another election reversed the ban. See Charles McCoy, Booze
Flows Back Into Barrow, Alaska, After Yearlong Ban, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1995,
at A1. As the Wall Street Journal reported:
The dry time in Barrow was the most peaceable in decades. Crime fell
70% during the one-year period. [Hospital director] Dr. Tim Coalwell
says alcohol-related emergency-room visits to the town hospital dropped
from 118 in the month before the ban to 23 the next month and remained low.
Id. The article also noted:
Alcohol-related calamities have afflicted nearly every village in Alaska.
Anne Walker, executive director of the Alaska Native Health Board,
and herself an Inupiat [Eskimo], calls alcohol abuse ‘the worst problem
facing native communities.’ She cites a recent survey by the Alaska Justice Center, a state agency, in which natives ranked alcohol and drug
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cation of warrantless searches presumably would apply to searches
for other damaging substances or materials, such as illegal drugs or
dangerous weapons. While none will dispute the tremendous effect alcohol has on NAVs, courts may nevertheless hold that warrantless searches for alcohol are so invasive that they constitute
unjustified intrusions upon personal liberties of NAV members
and non-members alike, and therefore divest NAVs of their border search powers.
The unique exercise of NAV sovereign powers is anything but
clear. However, it is clear that, while NAVs enjoy sovereignty, the
Supreme Court has significantly limited the inherent power of In111
dian tribes. Thus, NAVs must overcome the argument that warrantless searches for alcohol are inconsistent with NAV domestic
dependent status because they are unjustified intrusions on the
personal liberties of people entering NAVs.
2. Restrictions on free travel within the United States. NAV
searches for alcohol will not be viewed favorably by courts because
the searches interrupt the free passage of travelers lawfully present
within the United States and intrude upon individual privacy more
than international border searches. While the United States may
stop travelers at its international border, once they are lawfully
within the country, travelers are to be free from searches not
112
supported by probable cause. As Justice Rehnquist quoted in
113
United States v. Ramsey,
“It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent
were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of
abuse as the No. 1 problem in their society . . . . The state’s suicide rate,
for example, is the highest in the nation; while the rate among nonnatives is slightly higher than the national average, the rate among natives is four times the national average, according to the Alaska Native
Health Board.
Id.
111. Recent Supreme Court language reinforces the Court’s earlier decisions in
Oliphant and Montana limiting tribal sovereignty:
[T]he retained sovereignty of the tribes is that needed to control their
own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and
social order. The power of a tribe to prescribe and enforce rules of conduct for its own members “does not fall within that part of sovereignty
which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status. The
areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to
have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe
and nonmembers of the tribe.”
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685-86 (1990) (quoting United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)); see also Harrison v. State, 791 P.2d 359, 363 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that NAVs lack the authority to register vehicles and license
drivers).
112. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
113. 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
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finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the
highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.
Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in,
and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.
But those lawfully within the country . . . have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a
competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal mer114
chandise.”

While the Court does not address Indian tribes or NAVs, this
statement reflects the Court’s disapproval of extending the scope
of border search powers within the United States and interfering
with people’s right to free passage.
115
In Torres v. Puerto Rico, the United States Supreme Court
held that the search of Torres’s baggage upon his arrival in Puerto
Rico, pursuant to Puerto Rico’s Public Law 22, violated the prob116
able cause and warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment. In
this case, Puerto Rico emphasized that federal courts had recognized a variety of “intermediate borders” allowing searches not in
117
Examples included
compliance with the Fourth Amendment.
“state inspections of goods in furtherance of health and safety
regulations, . . . airport metal detector searches, and certain
118
Puerto Rico then asked the Susearches on military bases.”
preme Court to recognize an intermediate border between the
119
Commonwealth and the rest of the United States. To support
120
this proposal, Puerto Rico pointed to its “unique political status.”
Chief Justice Warren Burger curtly rejected Puerto Rico’s suggestion to extend border search powers in this manner, stating that
Public Law 22 cannot be justified by any analogy to customs
searches as a functional equivalent of the international border of
the United States. The authority of the United States to search
the baggage of arriving international travelers is based on its inherent sovereign authority to protect its territorial integrity . . . .
Puerto Rico has no sovereign authority to prohibit entry into its
121
territory.

114. Id. at 618 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54) (emphasis added).
115. 442 U.S. 465 (1979).
116. See id. at 471. The Puerto Rican law at issue, P.R. Laws Ann., Tit. 25 §
1051 (Supp. 1977), was designed to halt importation of narcotics and weapons.
117. See id. at 472.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 472-73.
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In United States v. Hyde,122 the United States District Court for
the District of the Virgin Islands rejected the proposal by the government of the Virgin Islands to extend border search powers to
123
their islands. Furthermore, in a later case, the same court ruled
that the islands “occup[y] a unique position with respect to customs regulations,” but did not constitute a border for purposes of
124
The
the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment.
court held that “persons lawfully in the United States Virgin Islands are entitled to the full panoply of rights enjoyed by citizens
125
travelling within the United States.”
As sovereign entities, NAVs can distinguish their position
from that of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, but they still face
an uphill battle to overcome the right to uninterrupted travel described by the Ramsey court. While Indian tribes do have the
126
power to exclude people from their reservations, as discussed
above, NAVs own their land in fee, not in reservations, and approximately half of the NAVs acknowledge their public status as
incorporated cities. Therefore, it is not clear if NAVs possess this
same exclusionary power; this determination may depend on the
Supreme Court’s ruling on whether NAVs occupy Indian country.
Even if NAVs are found to have exclusionary powers, however,
they may still be denied border search powers because the Court
has found significant differences between searches at international
borders and internal borders, and has shown low tolerance for the
interruption of lawful travel within the country.
Specifically, if NAVs do have the power to exclude nonmembers from their villages, border searches deny non-members
the expectation of uninterrupted travel. Likewise, village members can persuasively argue that once in the United States, their
travel should not be impeded without probable cause, especially
when traveling to their home villages. In addition, NAV searches,
unlike international border searches, come close to invading the
privacy of a person’s home. NAV searches for alcohol are con-

122. No. 1993-65, 1993 WL 733094 (D.V.I. Oct. 21, 1993).
123. See id. at *4-5.
124. United States v. Douglas, 854 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D.V.I. 1994) (citing
Hyde, 1993 WL 733094, at *4).
125. Id.
126. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In Worcester, the
Court held that a state law preventing “white persons” from exerting “assumed
and arbitrary power . . . under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians” or
residing in lands occupied by the Cherokee Indians was unconstitutional. Id. at
521. Federal laws had granted the Cherokees “their rights of occupancy, of selfgovernment, and the full enjoyment of those blessings which might be attained by
their humble condition.” Id. at 595.
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ducted at the airport runways of the village. Whereas American
citizens re-entering the United States are entering the nation they
only in a broad sense call home, resident villagers entering their
NAVs are entering the specific community in which they and their
families live. In that sense, the port of entry is the traveler’s home,
compared to a person entering the more general territory of a nation.
Furthermore, most citizens of the United States are able to
provide for their basic needs within the nation, without having to
travel to other countries. NAVs, however, are small communities
without the full range of services available to provide villagers with
their basic needs. Much medical treatment, for example, cannot be
provided in the village, as there are generally no nurses or doctors
127
stationed in NAVs. Instead, villagers must travel to larger communities with more developed medical facilities and more highly
trained personnel. If these villagers are then subjected to warrantless searches each time they return to their home village, their
privacy is intruded upon in a manner greater than international
travelers, most of whom do not need to leave the country for such
necessities.
Overall, while NAV searches for alcohol are noble in cause,
they force individual citizens to sacrifice one personal liberty in
order to exercise another. Such a scheme relegates the solemnity
of personal liberties to schoolyard constitutional card trading —
“I’ll give you the right to live with your family in your home if you
give me your right to be free from unreasonable searches.” Certainly this was not the intent of the Framers nor does it comport
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution:
“It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches
and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can
only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally
construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half
their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if
it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,
128
and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”

The passion and spirit of this statement could lead courts to
prohibit such warrantless searches because they are so contrary to
127. See, e.g., STATE OF ALASKA DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., VILLAGE
HEALTH CLINIC SURVEY (1992).
128. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1973) (quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)). Boyd held that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments apply to civil actions as well as criminal. See 116 U.S. at 634-35.
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fundamental tenets of American life that they are inconsistent with
the domestic dependent status of NAVs.
V. OTHER FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSES
Several exceptions to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment may also apply to ICRA. These exceptions are particularly
significant in the case of those Indian tribes which have voluntarily
adopted major portions of ICRA into their tribal Constitution, in129
cluding the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.
These tribes, and any NAVs who might also choose to comply with
ICRA, may find the analysis of these exceptions helpful.
A. General Urgency of Law Enforcement
The Supreme Court has strongly denounced the proposition
that the Fourth Amendment can be disregarded “simply because
130
of a generalized urgency of law enforcement.” In Torres, Puerto
Rico attempted to search travelers upon arrival without probable
cause in order to enforce their laws against weapons and narcotics
131
The Supreme Court flatly rejected Puerto Rico’s
importation.
claim that the searches were justified due to the seriousness of the
problems created by the influx of weapons and narcotics:
Puerto Rico’s position boils down to a contention that its law enforcement problems are so pressing that it should be granted an
exemption from the usual requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Although we have recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement when specific circumstances render compliance impracticable, we have not dispensed with the fundamental Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures simply because of a generalized urgency of law enforce132
ment.

Puerto Rico’s efforts to characterize its law enforcement
problems as “unique” did not persuade the Supreme Court to allow Puerto Rico to circumvent the Fourth Amendment. NAVs’
129. See 1 N.T.C. § 4 (1977) (Navajo Tribal Code) (adopting verbatim the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution); 22 C.N.C.A. § 1223
(1993) (Cherokee Nation Code Annotated) (“A search warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing
the person, and particularly describing the property and the place to be
searched.”); CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA, art. I (1975)
(“The Cherokee Nation is an inseparable part of the Federal Union. The Constitution of the United States is the Supreme Law of the land; therefore, the Cherokee Nation shall never enact any law which is in conflict with any federal law.”);
see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
130. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474 (1979).
131. See id. at 466-67.
132. Id. at 473-74 (citations omitted).
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unique law enforcement needs likely will fail to persuade the Court
as well. This likelihood of failure is evidenced by the Court’s
statement in Torres specifically addressing the relative uniqueness
of Alaska: “[i]n any event, Puerto Rico’s law enforcement needs
are indistinguishable from those of many states. Puerto Rico is not
unique because it is an island; like Puerto Rico, neither Alaska nor
Hawaii [is] contiguous to the continental body of the United
133
States.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s explicit disapproval of circumventing Fourth Amendment protections without a compelling
reason could lead federal courts to hold that NAV warrantless
searches for alcohol are so contrary to the nature of the United
States and the personal protections of its citizens that they are inconsistent with the domestic dependent status of NAVs and are
thus prohibited. This position is supported by the Court’s unanimous ruling in Torres and Justice Brennan’s concurrence:
“The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional
protections against arbitrary government are inoperative when
they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish
would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and under134
mine the basis of our Government.”

B. Consent to Searches
NAV warrantless and systematic searches for alcohol cannot
be justified by the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment if
travelers must agree to such searches in order to enter NAVs; in
such cases, the consent that searchers obtain is likely coerced. It is
well established that searches conducted pursuant to valid consent
are an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and prob135
The validity of consent under the
able cause requirements.
Fourth Amendment is to be determined by reference to “the tradi136
tional definition of ‘voluntariness,’” and does not require a
133. Id. at 474. The Court also rejected Puerto Rico’s assertion that its border
searches could be “sustained by analogy to state inspection provisions designed to
implement health and safety legislation.” Id. at 473. Alcohol creates no more of
an emergency situation than the weapons and narcotics against which the law in
Torres was directed. In such a case, invocation of health and safety concerns
amounts to little more than “a pretense employed to justify a warrantless search
for criminal law enforcement purposes,” Barusch v. Calvo, 685 F.2d 1199, 1200
(9th Cir. 1982), and is unlikely to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
134. Torres, 442 U.S. at 476 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (plurality opinion)).
135. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (upholding
the conviction of a defendant who consented to a car search).
136. Id. at 229.
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showing that the traveler was aware of his rights.137 However, the
Alaska Supreme Court reads the analogous provision of the
138
Alaska Constitution more restrictively: “‘consent to a search, in
order to be voluntary, must be unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, and is not
139
lightly to be inferred.’”
Even under the somewhat more relaxed federal standard, consent for NAV border searches likely is coerced. Most NAVs are
readily accessible by small airplane only, and because many NAVs
are not equipped to provide a full range of services, many villagers
must fly to bigger towns or cities to receive medical attention, find
employment, and/or to shop for goods not available in the small
village stores. Upon their return, if they do not wish to consent to
a search for alcohol and are denied entry to the village as a result,
they will find themselves stranded on the airplane runway, awaiting another plane to take them away from their homes and families.
Any search pursuant to such conditions does not satisfy the
consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements. Only if travelers are permitted to enter
NAVs without being searched – rendering such searches virtually
140
impotent – would consent be possible.
VI. LIKELIHOOD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TRIBAL BORDER
SEARCHES
Even if NAV warrantless searches for alcohol violate the
Fourth Amendment or ICRA, it may be that courts will never
make this determination. First, neither state nor federal prosecutors will likely bring criminal charges against a person based on
evidence seized in a search not supported by a warrant or probable

137. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (holding that the key
question is “whether . . . police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ request”);
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32 (distinguishing searches from the “structured atmosphere of a trial” and balancing the rights of the searched individual against
the need for effective on-the-spot law enforcement).
138. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14.
139. Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508, 515 (Alaska 1973) (quoting Rosenthal v.
Henderson, 389 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1968)). But cf. Sleziak v. State, 454 P.2d
252, 257-58 (Alaska 1969) (informing a searched individual of his exact rights under the Alaska or United States Constitutions was not essential to establish consent).
140. Cf. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (warrantless search of bus passenger
for cocaine was permissible because he was advised that he could refuse to be
searched without consequence).
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cause or satisfying an exception to the Fourth Amendment.141 Sec142
ond, the decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez does not
permit federal courts to review ICRA claims unless a tribe or
143
NAV detains a person. And third, civil suits against NAVs will
likely be extinguished by their sovereign immunity. As a result, it
appears that a fortuitous compromise has emerged. NAVs will not
likely be able to secure any convictions for alcohol importation
based on evidence seized in a warrantless search. However, NAVs
can search incoming travelers for alcohol without a warrant or
probable cause, pour out any alcohol discovered, and refuse entry
to offenders or those who refuse to be searched. While offended
travelers may bring suit for civil rights violations, such action
should be blocked by tribal sovereign immunity. Courts could
reach the issue, however, if an offended traveler litigates his claim
not as an ICRA violation, but rather as a domestic dependent nation limitation, and incorporates Fourth Amendment case law, as
well as the policy of protecting personal liberties, to demonstrate
that the searches are inconsistent with NAV domestic dependent
nation status. As explored above, however, the result is far from
apparent.
VII. CONCLUSION
Alcohol abuse has a devastating effect on the lives of many
rural Alaskans. In 1980, the Alaska Legislature passed a law allowing NAVs to outlaw the sale, importation, and/or possession of
alcohol. Presently eighty-three NAVs outlaw the sale, importation, and/or possession of alcohol. Some of these NAVs have attempted to further combat alcohol importation by conducting
searches of incoming travelers and their luggage. While NAVs
should be commended for actively trying to protect their communities, their systematic searches for alcohol are problematic because they are not supported by warrants or any showing of probable cause. The analysis arising from such circumstances would
appear to be simple. Searches not supported by a warrant or probable cause generally violate the Fourth Amendment. Several
unique factors, however, complicate the inquiry.
141. If the tribe attempts to prosecute a defendant searched without a warrant
or probable cause, and detains the defendant, the search would be subject to federal court review via a writ of habeas corpus and would almost certainly be held
to violate ICRA, resulting in suppression of any alcohol discovered in the search.
142. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
143. See id. at 58-59. As stated above, a traveler to the village could force the
issue by refusing to consent to a search by bypassing the officials performing the
searches and entering the village. If he or she is detained by village authorities,
an ICRA claim in federal court would then be cognizable.
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First, the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs recently recognized NAVs as Indian tribes.144 As such,
NAVs are sovereign entities and enjoy certain sovereign powers.
Most importantly, this means NAVs are not limited by the United
States Constitution, including the Fourth Amendment. While
NAVs are textually restricted by the Indian Civil Rights Act from
conducting searches without warrants or probable cause, ICRA is
only enforceable by federal courts if NAVs physically detain a person. Therefore, neither the Fourth Amendment nor ICRA effectively prohibit NAV warrantless alcohol searches.
Furthermore, NAVs can argue that as sovereigns, they are entitled to conduct customs searches at their borders without probable cause, just as the United States does at its international borders. NAV sovereignty arguably justifies warrantless searches at
their borders. However, the United States Supreme Court has
held that the sovereign powers of Indian tribes, which now include
NAVs, are limited by their status as “domestic dependent nations.” The Supreme Court cases Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
145
146
Tribe and Montana v. United States illustrate the Court’s willingness to find limitations of tribal power based on their domestic
dependent status. In Oliphant, the Court narrowly construed the
sovereign powers of Indian tribes and used the limitation of their
dependent status to deny them powers that intrude on the personal
147
NAV systematic and
liberties of citizens of the United States.
warrantless searches are especially intrusive upon villagers’ expectation of privacy because in effect the villagers are denied access to
their homes and families each time they leave the village unless
they consent to having their personal liberties violated upon return. Because this is so contrary to fundamental tenets of American life, the Supreme Court may find that these searches are inconsistent with the domestic dependent status of NAVs and are
therefore prohibited.
Finally, NAVs cannot employ traditional exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment such as general urgency of law enforcement or
consent. Although these exceptions are technically irrelevant because NAVs are not subject to the Fourth Amendment, they may
constitute grounds for courts to conclude that NAV warrantless
searches are inconsistent with the domestic dependent status of
NAVs.
In short, while the objective of combating the deleterious effect of alcohol abuse is noble, the means employed by NAVs vio144.
145.
146.
147.

See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 198.
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late the personal civil liberties that are cherished in the United
States. Nevertheless, judicial scrutiny may not arise. It is unlikely
that a prosecutor will try to secure a conviction based on evidence
seized in a search not supported by a warrant or probable cause.
Additionally, civil suits against NAVs will likely be extinguished
by sovereign immunity. The result is that NAVs may be able to
search travelers without a warrant or probable cause and destroy
any alcohol discovered, but they cannot detain violators, and any
evidence discovered in such searches will not be able to be used to
secure criminal convictions. Presently, a sea of questions and confusion surround NAV powers and status. Perhaps the Supreme
Court’s anticipated Indian country ruling will calm the waters with
answers, including the permissibility of NAV warrantless searches
for alcohol.

